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CASE COMMENTS

jeopardy, yet without benefit to the public by way of discouraging
the type of activity designated as a crime in any given instance.
EDWARtD A. STimi

CRIMINAL LAW: RIGHT TO BAIL PENDING APPEAL FROM
CONVICTION OF CAPITAL OFFENSE.
Gray v. State, 54 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1951)
Defendant was convicted of rape. On recommendation of mercy,
a sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment was imposed. Pending appeal, defendant applied to the trial court for supersedeas bond. The
application was denied. On review of the denial of bail, H-ar, reduction of sentence to fifteen years indicated extenuating circumstances warranting granting of bail pending appeal. Order reversed,
Justice Hobson and Associate Justice Lewis dissenting.
There are two conflicting theories as to the right to bail pending
appeal from conviction of a capital offense. The more prevelant view
is that there is no absolute right to bail after such conviction despite
recommendation of mercy and reduction of the death penalty to imprisonment." Under these circumstances the matter of bail lies in
the discretion of the trial court. 2 The opposing view is that, despite
conviction of a capital offense, a recommendation of mercy with a
sentence of life imprisonment or a lesser term of years entitles one
to bail as a matter of right.3
Previous Florida decisions have consistently been in line with the
former rule.4 The Florida Constitution provides that all persons
shall be bailable except in capital offenses when the proof is evident
or the presumption great. 5 The Florida Court, in line with most
'Ex parte Voll, 41 Cal. 29 (1871); State v. Christensen, 165 Kan. 585, 195 P.2d 592
(1948); Ex parte Carey, 806 Mo. 287, 267 S.W. 806 (1924); Ex parte Berry, 198
Wash. 317, 88 P.2d 427 (1939); Ex parte Hill, 51 W. Va. 536, 41 S.E. 903 (1902).
2See note 1 supra.
3Walker v. State, 137 Ark. 402, 209 S.W. 86 (1919).

4Ex parte Hyde, 140 Fla. 494, 192 So. 159 (1939); Stalnaker v. State, 126 Fla.
407, 171 So. 226 (1936); Ex parte Lamb, 89 Fla. 481, 104 So. 855 (1925); Ex parte
McDaniel, 86 Fla. 145, 97 So. 317 (1923).
5FLA. CoNsr. Decl. of Rights §9.
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other jurisdictions, has held that this provision neither confers the
right to bail pending appeal nor prohibits its being granted. 6 When
there has been a conviction of a capital offense with recommendation
of mercy, thereby carrying an automatic reduction of sentence to life
imprisonment, the Court has held that such automatic reduction is
not sufficient to warrant bail as a matter of right under the constitutional provision.7 The Florida statute dealing with the penalty
for rape formerly provided for such automatic reduction of sentence. 8
Since amendment in 1947, 9 however, the statute provides for punishment by death or, if a majority of the jury recommend mercy, imprisonment for life or for any term of years within the discretion of
the judge.' 0 In light of this statutory change, the instant case presents a reinterpretation of the Florida rule.
By reversing the order of the trial judge the majority of the Court
in effect determined that he had abused his sound judicial discretion
by denying bail after reducing sentence to fifteen years. In so doing
the Court speculated that the reduction of sentence presented evidence of extenuating circumstances sufficient to indicate that the
proof was not evident nor the presumption of guilt so great as to
prohibit the granting of bail pending appeal. In reaching this decision the Court has placed a premium on the moderation of the
sentence imposed as conclusive of extenuating circumstances. Such
a conclusion could have dangerous consequences. An obvious legislative intent in modifying the penalty for rape was to facilitate convictions. The right of the trial judge to sentence a convicted offender
to imprisonment for a term of years is persuasive in overcoming the
natural reluctance of juries to render a verdict of guilty that automatically brings a sentence of death or life imprisonment. That the
trial judge in fact exercises the discretionary power vested in him by
the legislature does not in itself indicate a lack of proof or rebut the
presumption of guilt. The test utilized by the majority of the Court
in reaching its decision poses a difficult question for the trial judge
considering sentence. If he has good reason to believe that the offender should not be granted bail, he may be forced to impose a
heavier sentence than he wishes in order to prevent the appellate
6Stalnaker v. State, 126 Fla. 407, 171 So. 226 (1936).
7Ex parte Lamb, 89 Fla. 481, 104 So. 855 (1925).

§794.01 (1941).
9Fla. Laws 1947, c. 24285, §1.
ioFLA STAT. §794.01 (1951).
8FLA. STAT.
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